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ECONOMIC TRADE-OFFS IN AIR 
POLLUTION ABATEMENT 
By Bruce C. Netschert" 
"Just such disparity 
As is 'twixt air and Angels' purity . ... " 
JOHN DONNE 
Pollution is an ugly word and air pollution is something we 
instinctively abhor. None of us, however, is free from sin on this 
score, for we are polluters, one and all, even if we don't drive or 
smoke. Nevertheless, polluters though we may be, it is safe to 
say that no one is for air pollution. It is not like water fluorida-
tion or, to use an economic example, like the protective tariff, on 
which there is a clear division of opinion. Rather, pollution 
abatement is like education; there is universal agreement that 
it is a Good Thing. This being so, the ubiquitous observer from 
Mars might well wonder what all the commotion is about. Why 
don't we get on with it and just abolish the nuisance-pass a 
law forbidding air pollution? 
This was, in fact, tried a while back. Edward I of England for-
bade the use of "sea coal" in London in the 14th Century in an 
attempt to eliminate the smoke problem, with the death penalty 
for repeated offenses. The success of this attempt is indicated by 
the fact that Elizabeth I, almost 200 years later, also felt com-
pelled to proclaim c~al-burning illegal. The lack of her success 
was even more conspICUOUS. 
What these English rulers came up against was, in effect, not 
far different from what faced one of their predecessors, King 
Canute. Although not a natural force, it might as well be one. 
To say that we are all polluters is facetious and gets us nowhere. 
There is, however, no facetiousness in the statement that our 
society cannot exist without creating pollution. It is even less 
possible today to eliminate pollution than it was for Edward and 
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Elizabeth to eliminate the burning of coal. The best we can do is 
lessen it. 
Not only is some pollution inevitable, but the economist, in 
his usual dismal fashion, concludes that in the absence of specific 
social action to the contrary the mess we now find ourselves in 
was also inevitable. The "invisible hand" of classical economics, 
the market mechanism on which we still basically rely, is im-
perfect and, as in numerous other instances, is unable by iteslf 
to bring about the social optimum. The costs resulting from each 
individual act of air pollution are not incurred by the emitter, 
but by society as a whole. Thus, since the emission is costless to 
the emitter, there is no economic motive for him to do anything 
about it. In the jargon of economics costs are sometimes referred 
to as "diseconomies," and social costs, since they are not in-
curred by the individual economic activity responsible for them, 
are termed "external diseconomies" or "externalities." In short, 
then, the costs of air pollution are externalities and because of 
this pollution tends to grow ad inijitum in the absence of social 
action to curtail it. 
This brings us up against another inevitability. If we assume 
that polluters in general are behaving in an economically rational 
fashion-a not unreasonable generality-it follows that the 
polluting activity of each is associated with minimization of his 
costs: if he could have reduced his costs by curtailing or elimi-
nating his emissions, he would have done so. This means that if 
his polluting is to be curtailed or eliminated, it will involve costs. 
Pollution abatement cannot be done free and we have, as a result, 
the first trade-off. As in all economic choices, we must balance 
what we would like to have against what it will cost, and air 
pollution abatement itself is an economic trade-off for society as 
a whole. l 
Since it is neither possible nor desirable to attain the good Dr. 
Donne's "angels' purity," it is necessary first to define the ulti-
mate goal or limit of air pollution abatement beyond which it 
would make no sense to pursue abatement further. In the last 
analysis, this goal is the threshold level, the demarcation between 
pollution in the meaningful sense and what is conveniently de-
scribed by the oxymoron, "non-polluting contamination." In this 
respect there is a similarity to another environmental "pollu-
tant," radioactivity-there is a natural background level from 
which we could, if we desired, isolate ourselves, but to do so 
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would be inherently wasteful of our time and resources. There is 
further similarity in the matter of threshold exposure and the 
complications of instantaneous and cumulative doses. As we 
know, the question of the threshold in establishing radioactivity 
safety levels has generated a good deal of incandescent argument 
in health physics, and here, too, there is a parallel in air pollu-
tion. In many instances, especially the sulfur oxides, the thres-
hold concentration which produces adverse physiological effects 
is still a matter of great controversy. 
In any event, within that limit, whatever it is, we must next 
establish a working goal toward which to aim our abatement 
efforts. Now we are really in the realm of economic trade-offs, 
for there is only one way in which we can make this decision and 
that is to compare the value of what we obtain with the cost of 
obtaining it. In the most general sense this is what is involved in 
any economic decision, made by anyone. To the economist it also 
suggests "cost-benefit analysis," the approach developed for 
similar decision-making where social costs are involved, as in 
flood control, for example. The costs of the proposed action 
(decision) are added up, a value is computed for the benefits, and 
if the latter exceeds the former there is, ipso facto, economic 
justification. In air pollution abatement, where there is a wide 
range of possibly justifiable actions, the cost-benefit approach 
offers the added advantage of determining the best action in 
terms of the optimal cost-benefit relationship. 
THE COST SIDE OF THE EQUATION 
Cost-benefit analysis has been developed into an elaborate 
technique in the justification of large public works such as dams, 
harbor improvements and the like. One of the problems in ap-
plying it to air pollution decision-making, however, is the far 
greater complexity of choices and the potentially wide ramifica-
tions of any particular choice. Consider, as an example, the re-
duction of sulfur oxide pollution from central power stations, 
one of the aspects of air pollution that has been emphasized in 
control programs to date. 
The approach that has been adopted in New York City to 
deal with this problem has been to set a standard for the maxi-
mum sulfur content of the fuel that is burned. If the fuel user 
desires to continue to burn the same type of fuel as before (i.e., 
coal or oil), he can meet this standard in a number of ways: by 
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using fuel in which the naturally occurring sulfur content is low 
enough to meet the standard, by desulfurizing the fuel so that it 
meets the standard, by blending high-sulfur fuel with low-sulfur 
fuel, or by any combination of these. Now it happens that the 
supply of coal and oil with high sulfur content is greater than 
that with low sulfur content, so that the price is lower, and this, of 
course, is why it was being used to begin with. Obviously, then, 
compliance with the air pollution standards means higher fuel 
costs, which are ultimately passed on to the consumer. 
It would appear to be a simple matter to take the difference 
between the high-sulfur fuel cost and low-sulfur fuel cost as the 
measure of the cost of the control program to society. There is 
much more to it than that, however. If the user decision is to go 
to foreign sources of naturally low-sulfur fuel oil, it means that 
African oil rather than the Venezuelan oil which previously con-
stituted the chief supply. The result could be a net shift in the 
balance of payments position of the United States, since Vene-
zuelian oil can be desulfurized either in the Caribbean or in this 
country. This balance of payments effect, as well as such non-
economic aspects as the implications for our international rela-
tions must be included in the cost calculation. With desulfuriza-
tion, the refiner also has a choice, over a wide range of propor-
tions, between producing fuel oil or other, more valuable petro-
leum products. The desulfurization cost itself may therefore be 
difficult to determine, since it may not be fully reflected in price. 
The difficulties of costing this particular means of air pollution 
control are compounded, moreover, by the fact that the control 
decision is necessarily an ex ante one; it is before the fact. There 
is no way of forecasting accurately, beforehand, which alterna-
tive or combination of alternatives the fuel users will choose. It 
might appear to be a straightforward matter of comparing the 
costs of the various alternatives and assuming that the fuel users, 
being economically rational, will choose the lowest cost one. This 
assumes, however, that the judgment of the fuel users and the 
pollution control authorities on the relative costs will be the 
same. In the case of the New York pollution control program the 
problem was even worse: no desulfurization capacity existed 
and it was impossible to guess how much would be installed as 
a result of the program if, indeed, any would be. 
But these difficulties pale beside those associated with the 
cost-benefit determination on coal. Sulfur exists in coal in both 
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organic and inorganic form. Removal of most of the inorganic 
sulfur is technically feasible and is normally accomplished as 
part of the preparation of coal for the market (although not 
necessarily for the specific purpose of desulfurization). Removal 
of the organic sulfur, however, is economically infeasible at 
present and there is no foreseeable prospect for feasibility. 
The ultimate standard established by New York City is a 
maximum 1 percent sulfur content in the fuel burned. A Bureau 
of Mines survey of 1964 coal production showed that 62 percent 
of the total u.S. production had a sulfur content of greater than 
1 percent. This production involved 70,000 miners, or 55 percent 
of the total mine labor force. In six producing states (Penn-
sylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri and Western Ken-
tucky) all of the output was coal with more than 1 percent sulfur, 
and these states accounted for 37 percent of the total mine labor 
force. Low sulfur content is a premium quality in the metallurgi-
cal use of coal, and three-quarters of the 1964 production of 
low-sulfur coal was for this use, both domestically and in the 
export market.2 
It is clear from this that the cost of the New York City control 
program, if properly measured, would have to take into account 
the expected adverse effect on the economy of the coal districts 
supplying coal to New York City as well as the balance of pay-
ments effect if it were assumed low-sulfur coal were used in the 
City instead of exported. 
There is also another user alternative-the use of other fuels. 
Natural gas is sulfur free. Like the cost of coal and oil, its cost to 
utilities is published information, so the difference in cost can be 
directly compared. Again, however, such direct comparison is 
insufficient. The imposition of a sudden, sizeable increment of 
demand in the market for gas may well have its own effect on the 
price of gas.3 This effect will depend on the supply characteristics 
of the gas industry, and any price changes would, in turn, have 
effects on the demand for gas by various types of customers. It 
is necessary, therefore, to consider the elasticity of both gas de-
mand and gas supply in considering the cost of a shift to gas. 
(There are difficulties here, too, but this is a matter economists 
prefer to discuss among themselves.) 
The utility fuel user can also go nuclear, although this is 
possible only for new plants. In the opinion of some, this would 
not be a cost, but a benefit. This point will not be argued, except 
ECONOMIC TRADE-OFFS 209 
to note two things: (a) nuclear cost figures in recent months have 
exhibited a volatility more appropriate to the high flyers of Wall 
Street; and (b) one of the costs of avoiding air pollution via the 
nuclear route can be an increase in the thermal pollution of our 
water resources. In any event, the significance of the nuclear 
option is that the nuclear-fossil fuel comparison must be made in 
determining the cost side of the cost-benefit equation. 
Similarly, the utility has the option in new plants of placing 
them outside the urban area and thereby (hopefully) escaping 
the sulfur limitation. It can be assumed that this also would 
definitely incur costs, since if it did not, it would have already 
have been made. And these costs, too, must be taken into ac-
count. 
At this point the stage shifts. We have been discussing alterna-
tives facing the fuel user in meeting an air pollution control 
standard limiting the sulfur content of fuels burned. But it 
should be borne in mind that such a limitation is a means to an 
end, not an end in itself. The goal of reduced sulfur pollution can 
be sought by other means, which constitute alternatives avail-
able to the control authority. One such alternative is desulfuri-
zation of the stack gases resulting from combustion. This has the 
advantage of requiring the investment to be made directly by 
the emitter rather than externally (as in fuel oil desulfurization). 
The cost of pollution abatement here is the addition to the unit 
cost of power being generated. 
Once again, despite appearances, the costing is not a simple 
matter (at least, as yet). Stack gas desulfurization is still in the 
experimental stage, and it is not at all clear which of the many 
processes being tested will be best, and under what circumstances. 
Much has been made of the fact that by using fuel of sufficiently 
high sulfur content stack gas desulfurization could be made cost-
less or even profitable through the sale of the recovered sulfur or 
sulfuric acid. It has been pointed out, however, that if only one-
half of the sulfur emitted in the combustion of coal and oil in 
this country were recovered in the form of elemental sulfur, it 
would increase domestic sulfur production by one-third; if the 
sulfur were recovered as S02 it would provide a quantity of 
sulfuric acid almost equal to the total annual domestic consump-
tion of that commodity.4 
A second alternative to limitations on the sulfur content of 
fuels is the high stack. The concept of the high stack as a means 
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of SOx pollution abatement is based on the distinction between 
the SOx concentration in emissions and ambient air concentra-
tion. This proposition is valid, however, only if it is true that 
through the use of high stacks, high emission levels will not result 
in high ambient levels. This is another area in which controversy 
is sharp, mainly because there are simply not enough empirical 
data on which to base policy. High stacks are being built, never-
theless (the newest one is over 1,200 feet tall), and with sufficient 
experience it should become clear whether dispersion can be 
counted on to offset high emission levels. 
The foregoing demonstrates that on the cost side of the cost-
benefit calculation the problem is one of complexity plus an in-
adequate empirical basis. Small wonder, then, that an inter-
departmental committee of the Federal Government concluded, 
after investigating abatement costs at the national level, " ... 
there are no acceptable national estimates of total investment 
or annual cost."o 
THE BENEFIT SIDE OF THE EQUATION 
Let us turn now to the benefit side of the equation. The prob-
lem here is to measure, in dollar terms, the benefits resulting from 
the abatement action. Unfortunately, there is no direct means 
of doing this: what is the value of clean air, as such? The best 
that can be done is to use the costs incurred because of pollution; 
in economic terms, the "opportunity cost" of pollution abate-
ment. If, due to pollution, a person spends $X, the value to him 
of an abatement program which eliminates that expense is those 
same $X, and this also holds true, of course, at the level of 
society as a whole. Pollution, however, is not a one-time thing 
but is continuous, so that there is not a single expense but a 
stream of expenses. The appropriate measure is therefore the 
total of those expenses over the appropriate time period, dis-
counted at an appropriate rate. 
As a theory this approach is impeccable, but as a practical 
means of measurement its usefulness is woefully limited. 6 For 
example, a New York State air pollution official has estimated 
that residents of New York City would save $800 million per 
year, or $50 per capita, in cleaning costs for clothing, homes and 
vehicles, if the State pollution criteria were attained. 7 On the 
other hand, figures presented by a staff member of the National 
Center for Air Pollution Control indicate that for the United 
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States as a whole the cleaning cost attributable to air pollution 
is in the neighborhood of$2.9 billion. 8 It is well known that New 
York City air is dirty, but it is unlikely that it is responsible for 
over one-quarter of the total cleaning bills of the United States 
attributable to air pollution. Obviously, one or the other of these 
figures is implausible, and given the crudity of the basic statistics 
from which they were derived, both of them are of doubtful 
validity. It is far from certain that they even represent the correct 
orders of magni tude. 
On another score, attempts have made to correlate property 
values with air pollution. It is evident that, other things being 
equal, a lot immediately downwind from a rendering plant will 
have a lower value than a lot five miles on the other side. But 
this is no help. Nor is it much help to know, from the findings of a 
regression analysis of sulfur trioxide levels and property values 
in the St. Louis Metropolitan Area, that there is a decrease in 
property values of $245 for every increase of 0.5 milligrams of 
sulfur trioxide per 100 square centimeters per day.9 Such pre-
cision belies the fact that no multiple regression analysis can 
adequately deal with the complex relationships of the many 
variables involved, much less the psychological factors. 
It is the latter, indeed, that stop measurement in its tracks. 
How is one to measure the health benefits of pollution abatement 
(assuming we can ever reach agreement on the health effects 
of pollution), or the esthetic values created by abatement? 
Granted, one could, after the fact, compare medical and hospital 
costs in a polluted area before and after abatement, but what are 
such values compared with the value to the individual of his 
improved health? We are in the realm of the wholly subjective, 
and until we possess some of the instruments of science fiction 
we must be content with frustration. 
USEFULNESS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
We have, then, two wholly different problems on the two sides 
of cost-benefit analysis. On the cost side we are led into a multi-
plicity of trade-offs, each of which must be explored if we are to 
make our decisions with maximum objectivity and which call 
for better data than have thus far been available. On the benefit 
side we are faced with formidable, if not wholly intractable 
measurement difficulties. Does this mean it is fruitless to use the 
cost-benefit approach, even if it is the only tool we have for 
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approximating rational decision-making? I do not think so, but 
before developing this point let us turn to a later stage in the 
process of air pollution abatement, the choice of regulatory cri-
teria and the tools of regulation. 
REGULATION 
It is important to recognize that the choice of criteria itself 
involves trade-offs which, although they may not be strictly 
economic, have economic implications. The relevant criteria are 
the ambient air standards which are the goal of the regulation 
and the maximum level of emissions permitted. Compare, for 
example, the ambient air S02 concentration criteria in the follow-
ing jurisdictions (all concentrations are by volume): 
St. Louis Metropolitan Area: 
0.25 ppm for 5 minutes, once in any 8 hours 
0.10 ppm for 1 hour, once in any 4 days 
0.05 ppm for over 24 hours, once in any 90 days 
San Francisco Bay Area: 
1.5 ppm for 3 minutes during the daytime, 6 minutes during 
24 hours 
1 




0.3 ppm for 8 hours during the daytime, 16 hours during 24 hours 
State of Colorado: 
0.5 ppm for one hour 
0.1 ppm for 24 hours 
There is, as can be seen, a wide variation in levels, duration 
and frequency in the various criteria, which is not surprising, 
since one would expect that the criteria would differ for different 
areas, each of which has its peculiar circumstances. The sig-
nificance of the figures in the present context is their indication 
of the almost infinite number of combinations of level, duration 
and frequency that is possible, and each combination has its own 
trade-off, or cost-benefit relationship. It is not clear how any of 
the listed criteria were arrived at, but probably not much con-
sideration was given to the trade-off aspects of the choice. To 
the extent this is true our air pollution regulators may not only 
be making implicit or unrecognized trade-offs on the wrong 
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terms, the trade-offs may be the wrong ones. The possibility 
becomes stronger, moreover, when the choice of criteria is 
widened to include not only ambient air levels but emission 
levels (without relating them to ambient air levels) and limita-
tions on the sulfur content of fuels. 
This is not to suggest that a marginal analysis in cost-benefit 
terms should be undertaken to determine which criteria consti-
tute the optimum trade-off of costs and benefits. Indeed, such 
a suggestion would be difficult to make in view of the emphasis 
which has been placed on the lack of data. It is suggested, how-
ever, that at the very least the authorities should be aware that 
they are engaged in trade-offs in the establishment of criteria, 
and would hope that within the limits of the imperfect knowledge 
of both costs and benefits their choice of criteria would represent 
balanced judgment rather than arbitrary discretion. It would 
be even more unfortunate if the authorities were to become 
wedded to initially established criteria when there is still great 
uncertainty with respect to their validity as pollution indicators, 
not to mention their efficacy as regulatory standards. It is also 
hoped, therefore, that established policy does not become dogma, 
and that the policy-makers will keep a continuing review under 
way and will be flexible enough to change policy if and when such 
a course is indicated. 
But there is still more to the catalog. Beyond the choice of the 
standard or standards there is the option in the ways in which 
they may be applied. Should standards apply without dis-
crimination, for example, or should there be some proportionality 
(or even disproportionality), depending on the degree of emis-
sion and/or its harmfulness? The in terdepartmen tal committee 
mentioned above investigated this matter with simulation 
models. One model, of a hypothetical city of two million popula-
tion, indicated that the cost of attaining an assumed pollution 
standard (60-75 percent reduction of human exposure to SOx and 
particulates), by requiring abatement only by those emitting 
harmful wastes and able to achieve abatement of those wastes, 
would be three-fifths of the cost of requiring all emitters to re-
duce their discharges by the same proportion. A second model, 
covering the central power stations in 20 cities with the worst 
SOx problem, indicated that by taking into account the prevail-
ing winds and the compass location of plants, and applying the 
standards on sulfur content of fuel used only to those plants in 
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the prevailing wind quadrant, the additional fuel cost incurred 
by pollution abatement would be only one-eighth of the cost if 
the standards were applied to aU plants.ID 
Again it behooves us, in the light of what has been said, to 
observe that no faith should be put in the actual numbers yielded 
by the models in view of the statistical deficiencies alluded to 
and the compounding of assumptions within the models. Ignor-
ing the actual levels, however, the numbers suggest that sig-
nificant cost differences can result from different applications of 
a given standard. Since the choice exists with a given standard, 
the trade-off in this instance is not between the costs and the 
abatement results. Instead, it is a balancing of the costs imposed 
by the different methods of application and the costs of adminis-
tering those methods. Thus, in the case of the single-city model 
one would expect, a priori, that across-the-board administration 
of a given emission standard would be less costly than selective 
administration. But the simpler administrative scheme involves 
higher costs to the polluters, hence to the public. The trade-off, 
therefore, is all on the cost side, and the optimum solution can 
be described, somewhat tautologically, as the "least-cost cost 
combination." 
TAX INCENTIVES 
Let us look at one last example. It has been emphasized that 
all abatement involves costs. As an alternative to the imposition 
of standards and the resulting ultimate imposition of costs on 
the public in general, there exists the possibility of using those 
costs to subsidize the polluters in their abatement efforts. Public 
funds could be given as outright subsidy, but this discussion will 
be confined to the type of subsidy that has been most frequently 
proposed-the tax incentiveY Since a tax incentive is at the 
cost of lower government revenues, the incentive, properly com-
puted and administered, could be made to result in a tax loss to 
the government equal to the cost of pollution control-i.e., the 
method of abatement I have been discussing heretofore. Assum-
ing the government wishes to maintain its revenues at the level 
that would prevail in the absence of the tax incentive, other taxes 
would be increased and the net position of the public in general 
would be unchanged. In the one instance the public pays through 
increased costs of the goods and services it purchases, in the 
other. it pays through increased taxes. 
Now it is unlikely that the incidence of the shifted tax burden 
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on the public will be distributed in the same fashion as the direct 
costs of abatement. We have, therefore, another trade-off in the 
decision between the two routes of obtaining abatement. Here 
the social advantages or disadvantages of the shifted tax inci-
dence must be compared with those of the direct cost incidence. 
The use of numerical values is impossible; the most that can be 
done is to use what aid to judgment can be obtained from the 
theoreticians in fiscal and welfare economics. Once again, how-
ever, the important point in the present context is not the pre-
cision with which the decision (between control and incentive) 
can be made but the fact that if it is to be done at all rationally, 
the trade-off must be recognized and in some fashion taken into 
account. 
If the fiscal route is followed, there are further trade-offs in 
the application of the incentive. Suppose, for example, the incen-
tive is offered in the form of a tax credit or accelerated deprecia-
tion to be allowed for investment in abatement facilities. Abate-
ment costs involve both capital and operating costs, but since 
such incentives would apply only to capital, they would tend to 
result in a disproportionate use of capital in abatement efforts. 
Thus, if a polluter had his choice between the use of low-sulfur 
fuel or stack gas treatment he would be more inclined to opt for 
the latter, which would increase his cash flow, than he would in 
the absence of the incentive. 
The same government study previously mentioned also in-
vestigated this subject and, noting among other things that fuel 
substitution (e.g., the use of low-sulfur fuel) was the indicated 
least-cost alternative in more than 60 percent of air pollution 
abatement, concluded that "tax writeoffs are not needed nor are 
they a desirable form for offering further assistance to industry."12 
Tax incentives, in other words, would not stimulate use of the 
lowest cost abatement technique. This judgment was no doubt 
influenced by the recognition that the use of tax incentives for 
pollution abatement is politically undesirable because it increases 
the pressure for similar treatment for other worthwhile causes 
such as education and housing. At this point we are back to where 
we started-the trade-offs we must consider because of our 
limi ted means and the many demands on those means. 
CONCLUSION 
Shelley has written, "one wandering thought pollutes the day." 
Let me conclude before I become the cause of any such pollution. 
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Again, it must be emphasized that to lay stress on the horrendous 
data and measurement difficulties involved in the application of 
cost-benefit analyis to the trade-offs is not to suggest that such 
analysis is useless and should therefore be avoided or by-passed. 
It is essential that costs and benefits, however defined, be com-
pared if pollution abatement is to be accomplished rationally, 
and it is unavoidable that such comparison be made if abatement 
is to be accomplished at anywhere near the least possible cost. 
It is urged that given the numbers problem, cost-benefit analysis 
be used in a pragmatic, not formulary fashion . 
.. +.--->.-<~.+ .. 
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